How Boston's Coconut Grove Fire Changed the Law?

The second most deadly single building fire in the history of the United States occurred at the Cocoanut Grove nightclub in Boston on November 28, 1942.  On that night 492 lives (including 64 servicemen) were lost, representing 50% of the 1,000 patrons flocking to the nightclub that evening.  Another 166 people suffered serious injuries ranging in severity from broken bones to pulmonary edema.  The  nightclub was grossly overcrowded  with more than double its rated capacity, as patrons celebrated Thanksgiving, enjoying a south-seas-style ambiance.  Patrons included both civilians and military personnel, on leave from the 19 Navy ships berthed at the nearby Chelsea Navy Yard.  All were seeking momentary relief from the horrors of the ongoing World war in Europe and Asia by enjoying dinner, drinks and dancing.  The deaths resulted from obvious causes, ranging from asphyxiation, toxic gases, and severe burns, to less obvious causes including, being crushed and trampled to death by those seeking to flee the smoke and flames.

 The fire began at approximately 10:15 pm in the Melody Lounge, a piano bar in the basement of the building.  The only exit from the Melody Lounge was a  narrow 4' wide stairway connecting the basement with the first floor that served as a chimney for the fire rather than an exit for the patrons.   Within just five minutes the fire became an inferno, flashing over throughout the basement and first floor, knocking out power, creating widespread panic in those seeking to flee though noxious smoke and darkness.  Flames rapidly spread everywhere, fueled by multiple sources.  The walls were covered with leatherette, rattan, bamboo and heavy draperies.  The ceiling was covered with satin and cloth canopies.  Throughout the building there were tropical themed decorations (i.e. palm trees),  and flammable gases (i.e. methyl chloride) in the air conditioning system due to a wartime shortage of freon. Those who did escape the inferno mostly did so within the first five minutes before the building plunged into darkness and confusion.

After the fact, it was discovered the building was a natural firetrap, and the owner was convicted of involuntary manslaughter.  The floor plan was a meandering collection of dining rooms, bars and lounges with no clear exit.  The main exit was a revolving door at the front of the building, only allowing 1 person to exit at a time, that quickly became clogged and inoperable.  Secondary exits opened inwards, and became a wall as panicked patrons pushed against the inward swinging doors to flee the flames.  Other exits were locked, concealed by decorations or curtains, or blocked by supplies.  Still other exits had been bricked over or welded shut as a leftover from the prohibition era when the club served as a speakeasy.  Most of the victims simply were unable to get out of the building and were overcome by smoke, noxious fumes, and flames.  More than 180 fireman were summoned to extinguish the five-alarm fire, however they had the same difficulty entering the building as the patrons had getting out.  When the fire was extinguished, and first responders could get into the building, piles of victims were discovered at many of the exit doors.

The catastrophe resulted in major changes to fire and safety laws for public buildings.  One major change involved formation of the National Fire Protection Association or NFPA.  The NFPA proposed hundreds of new fire and safety standards, most of which were adopted by the States, including: 

• Multiple exits were now required.  
• Exits could not be locked or obstructed.  
• Inward opening exit doors were banned.  
• Revolving exit doors were banned, unless accompanied by at least one outward opening exit door or retrofitted with collapsing leaves in the event of emergencies.  
• Emergency lighting was required, including lighted exit signs easily visible. 
• Fire sprinklers triggered by temperatures above 140 degrees were required. 
• Smoke detectors were required.
• Building materials and certain walls and partitions must be fire rated. 
• Furniture, decorations, and wall/ceiling treatments were required to be fire resistant. 

Such common sense standards had never been required prior to the Cocoanut Grove fire. 

Unfortunately, these changes in fire and safety laws have not prevented catastrophes similar to the Cocoanut Grove fire.  On February 20, 2003, 100 patrons died and 200 were injured in the Station Nightclub Fire in West Warwick Rhode Island.  Tragically, the Station Nightclub Fire was caused by many of the same violations causing the Cocoanut Grove Fire, sixty years earlier. Notably, the Station Nightclub was overcrowded, limited available exits, used combustible decorations, and allowed pyrotechnics indoors during a rock concert.  Fire and safety laws are often made, but not always followed.