Understanding Negligence and the Doctrine of "Proximate Cause"!

Not every wrong gives rise to a remedy!  This principle is especially applicable to tort law.  A tort is the breach of a public duty causing injury or damage to a third-party. The public duty is typically a rule or standard of conduct imposed by common law, imposed by the Courts, or statute enacted by the legislature. The third-party could be someone known or a complete stranger.  The issue as to whether the third-party has a remedy against the party committing the tort or “tortfeasor” is defined by the doctrine of “proximate cause”.   Simply put, “proximate cause” deals with whether acts or omissions of the “tortfeasor” committing the wrong caused and is responsible for the injury or damage sought by the third-party. 

There are two prominent definitions of “proximate cause,” one or the other of which has been adopted by most every State.   Both definitions were contrasted in a famous case - Palsgraf vs. Long Island Railroad Co. - decided by the highest Court of New York State in 1924.    In Palsgraf, a male traveler aided by 2 railroad workers was boarding a moving passenger train, when the traveler dropped a package of fireworks setting off a large explosion.  As a result of the explosion, a large luggage scale on the train platform, approximately 25'-30' away toppled over striking a mother with 2 children awaiting to board another train. The mother sustained bruising and head injuries and sued the railroad company alleging the workers negligently caused the explosion which resulted in her injuries.  A jury awarded Palsgraf  $6,000 in damages, and was upheld on initial appeal.

The highest court of New York reversed the jury award in a 4-3 decision absolving the railroad of all liability.  The majority opinion was drafted by Chief Judge Benjamin Cardoza, a future justice of the US Supreme Court.  Cardozo stated the railroad workers may have acted negligently towards the passenger they were seeking to assist, but did not do so towards Palsgraf.  He reasoned “proof of negligence in the air … will not do … and the risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed”.   Cardozo concluded proof of negligence by a tortfeasor coupled with injury or damages to a third-party is not enough - there must be a duty owed to the third-party by the tortfeasor.  Since any negligence towards the passenger on the part of the the the railroad workers could not be reasonably foreseen to cause the scale to fall, the railroad owed no duty to Palsgraf.  According to Cardozo “proximate cause”  was defined by a “foreseeability test”  requiring a showing that the injury or damage was a reasonably foreseeable result of the negligent act.

The minority opinion was drafted by William Andrews, who was promoted to Chief Judge after Cardoza was elevated to the US Supreme Court.  Andrews rejected the “foreseeability test”  in lieu of a “but for test”  requiring a showing that the injury or damage would not have occurred “but for” the negligent act.  He reasoned that a tortfeasor should be “liable for all proximate consequences, even where they result in injury to one who would generally be thought to be outside the radius of danger”.  Andrews reasoned that everyone owes a duty of care to protect society from unnecessary danger and not just to protect those who might be foreseeably harmed.  According to Andrews, proximate cause was defined by a “but for test”  requiring a showing that the injury or damage was not so remote in time or space to show it would not have occurred but for the negligent act. 

A hundred years after the Palsgraf decision, most States still use either the “foreseeability test” or the “but for test” to determine whether a wrong committed by a tortfeasor gives rise to a remedy to a third party!