Michigan Allows Subjective Religious Beliefs as Defense to Parental Neglect

Last week, saw an opinion in a tragic case involving the intersection of child welfare and apparently sincere religious beliefs.  The Michigan Court of Appeals considered the appeal of two parents who had lost their parental rights because they refused to seek medical care for their children.  The case is difficult reading.  Their youngest child died of a treatable illness after the mother told the midwife, "God makes no mistakes, our baby is fine." When the child's condition worsened, the family sought prayer, but not medical help.  Another adult relative finally called emergency services after the baby died. Child Protective Services investigated and removed the two older children from the home. CPS also removed a later-born child who suffered from the same condition as the child who died.  

CPS also moved to terminate parental rights.  At the jury trial, the parents invoked Michigan Compiled Laws (MCL) 722.634, which says, "A parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who thereby does not provide specified medical treatment for a child, for that reason alone shall not be considered a negligent parent or guardian."  The trial judge refused to give a jury instruction based on that law, ruling that "legitimately practicing" requires that the beliefs be a recognized tenet of an organized religion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a person need only be sincerely motivated by religious beliefs for the law to apply.  

The result seems counterproductive to child welfare advocates, but it is in line with long-standing U.S. Supreme Court precedent.  In 1989, the Court held in Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989), that the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution does not require "adherence to a tenet or dogma of an established religious sect." I worked on that brief on behalf of Mr. Frazee early in my legal career and remember the predictions that the opinion would open the floodgates to individualized and temporarily-advantageous beliefs. Thirty-two years later, we have not seen that flood.  

As the Michigan Court of Appeals noted, the jury on retrial could determine that the plaintiffs were not sincere in their beliefs, given at least two occasions on which they obtained medical care for themselves. The Court also pointed out that the religious beliefs was an exception only to the charge of negligence:

For instance, under MCL 712A(b)(2), jurisdiction is proper over a child “[w]hose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent . . . is an unfit place for the juvenile to live in . . .” As only one of the options relates to a negligent parent, a jury could find grounds for jurisdiction if it found that the minor children’s home was an unfit place for them to live in because of cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity.

Furthermore, even the religious beliefs exception in MCL 722.634 allows a court to intervene to order medical care, and does not "abrogate the responsibility of a person required to report child abuse or neglect."  Thus, anyone listed as a mandated reporter in MCL 722.623 should have notified emergency services well before the first baby died. From what I can tell, the midwife, as a licensed health care provider, should have reported the child's condition and the parents' refusal to seek care.

Religious freedom cases that involve child welfare are agonizing, and it would be easy to go for a quick fix of shutting down any exceptions for sincere religious beliefs.  As the Michigan court noted, however, such restrictions are not necessary.   Laws allow concerned people to report children who need medical care, no matter what beliefs motivate the parents.  As in all child welfare cases, the key is for the intervention to happen before, rather than after, tragedy.